# 1NC—Practice Debates

## Off case

### 1NC—Growth DA

#### Uniqueness and Link – US hegemony is preeminent now, but avoiding *strong SOE’s* and *investment growth in China* and will prove key.

Tellis ‘14

(Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>)

All these realities—being a continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy, enjoying superior rates of relative economic growth, having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military capabili - ties—add up quickly to make China a far more consequential rival to the United States than any Washington has faced in the past. Although U.S. officials are bashful about describing China plainly as a geopolitical threat, there is little doubt that they recognize the possibility of a coming power transition, with all its attendant dangers. Because of the perennial arguments among liberals, realists, and neoconservatives, there is no agree - ment in Washington about what the implications of this transition might be. Yet it is precisely this contingency that U.S. grand strategy should aim to thwart because American primacy has been beneficial for the international system and, even more importantly, for the United States itself. Preserving this preeminence, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. Devising a strategy that is equal to this responsibility must begin with an acknowledgment of both the significance and the complexity of the challenge given China's deep enmeshment with the world. There is no better way to begin this assessment than by recognizing that globalization in the postwar period has spawned uneven gains that have produced in China a new competitor to the United States. This most recent bout of international integration has been reinvigorated and nurtured by American hegemony, understood simply as possessing more comprehensive power than any other state and being willing to use that power to structure the global order in certain ways. Beijing's continuing ascent in these circumstances creates a difficult dilemma for Washington: unlike previous great powers that rose largely through autarkic means, China has grown rapidly because it has benefited disproportionately from American investments in sustaining a liberal international economic order. China, admittedly, is not alone in this regard. Many other European and Asian states have enjoyed economic Devitalization in the postwar period because of their integration into the multilateral trading system underwritten by American power. But China has experienced disproportionately greater gains than the United States and others because its native comparative advantages have been magnified through three distinctive poli - cies. First, Beijing has opted to maintain a domestic economy characterized by significant protectionist components even as it has pursued an investment-driven, export-led growth strategy that exploits the free access available to the more open economies of the developed world. 22 Second, the dominant role of the Chinese state in economic decisionmaking has permitted the government to control critical factors of production, such as land and capital, maintain advantageous exchange rates, and sustain huge state-owned enterprises, which in their totality have enabled China to advance nationalist aims beyond simply allocative efficiency and the increased welfare of its population. 23 And third, the consistent and systematic targeting of foreign intellectual property on a gigantic scale has advanced China’s industrial policy goals, which emphasize the speedy acquisition of advanced technologies by both legitimate and illegitimate means in order to accelerate Chinese growth vis-à-vis other rivals in the international system. 24 All these elements operating in unison have raised China’s level of development, which in turn has helped increase American welfare through trade—but at the cost of embodying a rising challenge to U.S. power. However, it is by no means inevitable that China will continue to rise to the point where it becomes a genuine peer competitor of the United States. Although China has experienced meteoric economic growth in recent decades, the Chinese state has manifold weaknesses. It grapples with the prospect of adverse demographic transitions, contradictions between Beijing’s command polity and pseudo-liberal economy, and an unbalanced growth strategy that emphasizes overinvestment at the cost of domestic consumption. These weaknesses may yet take their toll, leading to either a collapse of China’s hitherto relentless expansion or its severe moderation.

(Note: “SOE’s” are “State-Owned Enterprises”.

#### US review blocks Chinese SOE’s now. Post-plan, China will be positioned to expand their State-run interests.

Chow ‘15

Daniel C.K. Chow - Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. “WHY CHINA WANTS A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES” - BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Volume 33 – available at: https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty.pdf

First, a BIT may allow China to expand the reach and influence of China's SOEs, which are likely to benefit most from the BIT. China has a national policy of promoting SOEs to become "national champions" that can compete with the world's largest multinational companies. Three of the ten largest companies by revenue in Fortune's Global 500 are from China.33 Furthermore, China leads the list of newcomers to the Global 500 in 2014 with seven of the twenty-three new companies.34 U.S. federal laws subject FDI by Chinese SOEs to scrutiny and allow the United States to block such investments unilaterally to protect U.S. national interests.35 In addition. U.S. politicians can informally pressure U.S. and Chinese companies to abandon various FDI projects. For example, in 2005, the U.S. Congress, citing national security concerns, pressured a Chinese state-owned oil company to withdraw its bid to purchase Unocal, a U.S. energy company.36 The United States' concern is that SOEs, as instruments of the State and the Communist Party, make their decisions in accordance with policy goals of the State-Party, which may threaten the economic viability of U.S. firms at home and abroad. China asserts, on the other hand, that SOEs make decisions based solely on commercial considerations.38 Part LB will examine this issue in further detail.39 For now, it is important to emphasize that once China enters into a BIT with the United States, it could become more difficult for the U.S. government to block FDI by Chinese SOEs in the United States. Under the 2012 Model BIT, used by the United States in negotiating all of its BITs, China will acquire rights and protections not currently enjoyed under U.S. law.40 These new rights and protections could prevent the United States from unilaterally blocking FDI projects by Chinese SOEs.41 Moreover, not only does the Model BIT contain important new rights and protections for foreign investors, but it also offers a dispute resolution mechanism in which the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), an international tribunal, resolves investment disputes through binding arbitration.42 In other words, while the United States currently has the final say on whether to approve a Chinese investment (just as the Chinese government has the final say over FDI in China), once a U.S.-China BIT is effectuated, the final determination could be in the hands of a neutral international tribunal.

(Note: “SOE’s” are “State-Owned Enterprises”. “FDI” is “Foreign Direct Investment”)

#### Economic growth allows China to leverage power against the US. That erodes US hegemony and turns the Aff by increasing tensions.

Tellis ‘14

(Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>)

Although American mistrust of China is perhaps not as acute—at least right now, given the U.S. advantages in relative power—there is little doubt that significant anxieties persist because of challenges in diverse areas ranging from economic relations to military operations to alliances and geopolitics. As China’s power continues to grow, the discordance between Washington and Beijing in these and many other areas will likely be aggravated, thus intensifying the competition between the two countries. As Aaron Friedberg summarized it succinctly, “the United States and the People’s Republic of China are today **locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power** and influence, not only in Asia but around the world.”5 When all is said and done, this deepening Sino-American power-political competition derives fundamentally from the fact that both nations find themselves trapped in inescapable opposition. The United States seeks to protect its global hegemony—as it must, if it is to advance its varied national interests—while rising Chinese power is oriented toward eroding that U.S. primacy, which remains the most dangerous external constraint on Beijing’s ability to use its steadily accumulating power to reshape the extant political order to serve its own interests. This rivalry is manifested in diverse ways, from contests over control of the Asian rimlands and the Indo-Pacific to ideological competition over different models of state-society relations. It is ultimately rooted, however, in material factors, namely what Robert Gilpin has called “the uneven growth of power among the dominant states in the [international] system.”6 Power, in this context, is a multidimensional phenomenon. It refers to the ability of a state to protect its freedom of action through the possession of superior economic capabilities that in turn **enable the production of requisite military strength**. These twin foundations allow a state to acquire the other trappings of power, such as the ability to attract and protect friends and allies, secure a seat at the high tables of international governance, and popularize ideologies that help to secure international acceptance of its standing. China’s expanding economy, which has grown at an average of some 10 percent of gross national product (GNP) annually during the past thirty-odd years, has enabled it to become the new global power most capable of challenging U.S. primacy. Shorn of all subtlety, Beijing’s rise poses a special problem for U.S. interests because it threatens a possible power transition at the core of the global system. If China continues to grow at higher rates than the United States well into the future, it could in time displace Washington as the most important entity worldwide and threaten the postwar international order that has been built and maintained by preeminent American power.7

US hegemony prevents escalating global wars

Keck, ‘14

(Zachary, Managing Editor of the Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/>)

Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.

### 1NC—Elections

#### Obama’s rising popularity ensures Clinton wins in 2016 – attempts to distance from plan or stick obama with the blame only undermine her coattails strategy

Stanage 16 --- Niall, Contributor @ The Hill, "Clinton's ace in the hole: Obama," 5/29, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/281575-hillary-clintons-ace-in-the-hole-obama)

Hillary Clinton will have a not-so-secret weapon in her quest for the White House: President Obama. Obama’s approval ratings have been marching upward since the start of the year. He retains immense popularity with the Democratic base, including vital groups such as young people, with whom Clinton has struggled. And experts also say that there is no one better positioned to unify the party behind the former secretary of State as her long and sometimes bitter struggle with primary rival Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) draws to a close. If Obama could run for a third-term, “he’d be reelected in a walk,” said New York-based Democratic strategist Jonathan Rosen. “He can play a huge role in bringing the Democratic base and independents, together to unite behind her candidacy.” That could be particularly important given evidence from the primary season that suggests Clinton has failed to thrill some parts of the Obama coalition, even while she has drawn strong support from other blocs. She has struggled mightily among younger voters, for example, even while beating Sanders by huge margins among African-American Democrats. The political relationship between Obama and Clinton is a long and knotty one. Distrust still festers among some of the aides who worked for each candidate during their titanic 2008 primary struggle. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton rallied support for Obama in the general election that year, even coming to the Democratic National Convention floor to move a motion for the then-Illinois senator to become the nominee. In 2012, former President Bill Clinton — whose role in the 2008 primary was contentious — gave a famously effective speech lauding Obama’s economic record. Before Hillary Clinton began her quest for the presidency this time around, she seemed to distance herself from the man whom she served as secretary of State. Back in August 2014, she critiqued a foreign-policy view synonymous with Obama saying, “Great nations need organizing principles and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle.” That attitude carried through into the early months of the campaign. Last fall, according to NPR, she told voters in Davenport, Iowa, “I am not running for my husband’s third term of President Obama’s third term. I am running for my first term.” Clinton’s rhetoric shifted as the challenge from Sanders became more serious, however. On healthcare, she cast herself as the protector of Obama’s signature domestic achievement, the Affordable Care Act. A Clinton ad on gun control featured the candidate saying, of the president, “I’m with him.” Part of Clinton’s pivot was clearly aimed at stopping the Sanders insurgency in its tracks. But Clinton’s political proximity to Obama could pay dividends in the general election, too. Gallup’s daily tracking poll at the end of last week showed 52 percent of adults approving of Obama’s job performance and 44 percent disapproving. At the beginning of the year, Obama won approval from just 45 percent of adults in the equivalent poll, while 51 percent disapproved. Some independent experts believe that the feverish tone of the primary season in both parties has fueled Obama’s climb. “As the conflicts got more into the gutter during the primary season, President Obama looks much better by comparison,” said Grant Reeher, a professor of political science at Syracuse University. “I think that he personally has been helped by what has happened in both primaries — but particularly the Republican one — which reminded people why they liked the guy eight years ago.” Experts like Reeher noted that traditionally it has been difficult for a candidate to win the White House after his or her party has held the presidency for the preceding eight years. Only once since 1948 has someone pulled off that feat. President George H.W. Bush succeeded his fellow Republican President Reagan by winning the 1988 election. But 2016 could be exceptional. The polarizing nature of the presumptive Republican nominee could leave some voters seeking a “safe haven” with a known quantity such as Clinton, experts say. That dynamic could be enough to counteract Clinton’s own lowly favorability numbers, as well as the traditional reluctance to give a party three successive White House terms. “It is obviously a challenge to win the White House for three straight elections and as a candidate, as a front-runner, everyone takes shots at you. But that challenge can be overcome when you have a popular sitting president,” said Democratic strategist Evan Stavisky.

#### BIT allows Trump to tap into China-specific Anti-Trade rhetoric. That message will be uniquely powerful in this election cycle.

Ou ‘16

David Ou is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at UCLA. David is interested in international and regional development and the role of business and trade in creating a common prosperity. Before returning to school to pursue his Master’s at UCLA, David conducted field research projects as a student at Fudan University, completed an independent research project on private enterprises in the Pearl River Delta, and developed business opportunities with a local trading company in Southeast Asia. “Mayhem and Accusations: US-China Investment Politics” – From the Magazine: The Generation - May 17, 2016 - http://the-generation.net/mayhem-and-accusations-us-china-investment-politics/

US-China investments are, not surprisingly, filled with controversy. Business and commerce are becoming an increasing part of the countries’ rivalry. Both countries accuse each other of economic hostilities. China accuses the US of encirclement with the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and electronic intelligence collection in the country. The US accuses China of intellectual property violations and cyber and industrial espionage. The suspicion has led many in America to become wary of China’s investments, especially in military-sensitive areas like semiconductors. In February, Fairchild Semiconductors rejected a Chinese acquisition offer for an inferior US offer because of possible CFIUS intervention. In 2015, Tsinghua Holdings, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) invested in by Tsinghua University, attempted to purchase a number of semiconductor enterprises including a bid for a unit of Philips. Philips rejected the deal over concerns expressed by CFIUS revolving around gallium nitride, a next-generation microchip material, which US anti-air Patriot Missile systems use. These issues with Chinese investments partly stem from the fundamental economic nature of the Chinese state. The Chinese state is very much an economic state, with the line between politics and business frequently blurred. SOEs consist of over 40 percent of China’s non-agricultural GDP. Even after extensive privatization within the past few decades, SOEs continue to occupy a significant position of power as strategic “pillars” of the economy; economic success is political success. Top executives of key SOEs are privileged with red phones that connect directly with China’s party elite and other SOE executives. The Chinese state frequently promotes “national champions,” companies that not only seek profit but also support national interests. SOEs are normally supported to keep an economic sector Chinese, or secure sectors like steel and telecommunications from failure. For example, UnionPay is considered “the champ of all national champions” by dominating the Chinese credit card industry as a monopoly. Critics attribute UnionPay’s supremacy to state protection with unwarranted foreign entry bans. It is easy to see the incentives for the Chinese to conduct industrial espionage if the state is literally invested in the economy. With an intimate state-business relationship, US concerns will not easily be mollified as Chinese investments continue to increase. Fortunately, a US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that has been under negotiation since 2013 seems to be reaching its conclusion this year. Its details are not yet available to the public but the agreement could potentially offer clarity and protection to investors on both sides of the Pacific with clearer CFIUS determination criteria for foreign investors and proper regulations on SOE investments to alleviate American fears. By working out a proper agreement, legitimate investors will be able to make efficient economic decisions rather than take on suboptimal investments they think will be approved by CFIUS. But, as the Presidential election cycle winds up this year, more anti-trade and anti-treaty sentiments will rise. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican candidate, has tapped and fomented anti-Chinese sentiments with vitriolic attacks on bilateral trade and economic relations, threatening the BIT’s future. This is a shame. The US stands to benefit the most from foreign direct investment because of its low domestic savings and, in some cases, by allowing investments to resurrect local economies. In setting up mutually agreed upon rules, both countries may reduce the mayhem and accusations that inhibit business and investment as well as a robust US-China relationship. Such stability will allow investors like last month’s waste delegation to first ask how their investment will thrive rather than how it will survive.

#### That flips the election for the GOP – our link prices in other factors and we don’t need to win that Hillary gets the blame

Needham 16 (Vicki, The Hill, 1/21, “Moody’s model gives Dem candidate advantage in 2016,” <http://thehill.com/policy/finance/266668-moodys-model-gives-dem-candidate-advantage-in-2016>)

The Democratic presidential nominee will win the race for the presidency, but the election is shaping up as historically tight, according to a political model. Less than 11 months from Election Day, Moody’s Analytics is predicting that whomever lands the Democratic nomination will capture the White House with 326 electoral votes to the Republican nominee’s 212. Those results are heavily dependent on how swing states vote. The latest model from Moody’s reflects razor-thin margins in the five most important swing states — Florida, Ohio, Colorado, New Hampshire and Virginia. In each of those states, the Democratic advantage is less than 1 percentage point, well within the margin of error. The election model weighs political and economic strength in each state and determines the share of the vote that the incumbent party will win. The most important economic variable in the model is the growth in incomes in the two years leading up to the election. That factor captures the strength of the job market in each state, including job growth, hours worked, wage growth and the quality of the jobs being created. The model also factors in home and gasoline prices. So far, the strength of the economy has kept the model on track for the Democratic nominee. But the trajectory of the president’s approval rating also makes a difference in who could win the White House. If President Obama’s approval rating shifts only a little more than 4 percentage points, a bit more than the margin of error for many presidential opinion polls, the move could further cut into Democratic hopes to retain the White House. Growing concern about terrorism and other issues could dent Obama’s approval rating further.Usually, if the sitting president’s approval rating is improving in the year leading up the election, the incumbent party receives a boost. But in most elections, the president’s rating has declined in the lead-up to the election, favoring the challenger party.

#### extinction – climate change, global wars, and turns case

Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf)

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to “cancel the Paris climate agreement“, end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the “stupid” Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress. In past comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax” and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump’s candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them “thugs” and “criminals”. His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump’s promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump’s bravado and reckless unpredictability, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict. In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher.

## On case

### 1NC—China War

#### Bilateral Investment Treaty’s inevitable in the status quo.

Tiezzi ‘16

Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Shannon’s main focus is on China, and Shannon writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation and received an A.M. from Harvard University and a B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “Are China and the US Close to Sealing an Investment Treaty?” – The Diplomat – March 24nd - http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/are-china-and-the-us-close-to-sealing-an-investment-treaty/

China and the United States are almost finished with negotiations over a key investment treaty, former Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming said on Wednesday. If successfully concluded, the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) could substantially increase Chinese and U.S. investments in each other’s markets. A BIT between China and the United States has been in the works for eight years. In 2013, the two sides announced that they were finally ready to enter “substantive BIT negotiations” after nine rounds of talks on technical issues. Now, according to Chen, the two sides are almost finished. Xinhua cited the former commerce minister, who was speaking at the Boao Forum for Asia, as saying that most of the key issues in BIT negotiations have been resolved. Chen mentioned that both sides have agreed, for example, to handle disputes between the host country and investors via third-party arbitration at the World Bank.

1. Interdependence fails to deter US China conflict

Friedberg ‘11,

(Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, pg. 46-47)

Trade may continue to dampen any tendencies toward conflict and perhaps in time could help to draw the United States and China closer than they are today. **But there are grounds for skepticism.** Unfortunately, **there is little reason in theory or historical experience to believe that economic links alone are** sufficientto create lasting stability, still less perpetual peace.^ Even if interdependence helps suppress mutual hostility, **it will not necessarily constrain nations from engaging in various forms of competitive behavior**, including arms races and the construction of opposing alliances. **Such geopolitical maneuvering can lead to escalatory spirals of mistrust, a breakdown in political and economic relations, and even** open conflict. It is also sadly the case that governments are not always deterred by the prospect of economic loss. Leaders often underestimate the costs of their decisions, whether because they do not recognize that a certain course of action will lead to conflict or because they assume, mistakenly, that whatever trouble results will be short and minimally disruptive. Even if it means knowingly damaging the livelihood of powerful interest groups, or of an entire nation, rulers sometimes choose to put reasons of state **above concerns for material well-being**. One does not have to go very far afield to find potential illustrations of this point. China is bound even more tightly by economic ties to Taiwan than it is to the United States. Yet few observers doubt that Beijing would use force to prevent moves toward independence, despite the enormous direct costs of doing so, to say nothing of the possibility of economic sanctions, limited conventional conflict, and perhaps even a nuclear exchange with the United States.

#### No SCS war coming in the squo.

Ignatius ‘14

David Ignatius is an associate editor and columnist for the Washington Post. He is a former Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and currently Senior Fellow to the Future of Diplomacy Program. “A U.S.-China ‘reset’?” – Washington Post – December 16th - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-a-us-china-reset/2014/12/16/981db07e-855f-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25\_story.html

This year began with some Chinese and American foreign-policy analysts looking back a century to World War I and wondering if confrontation was inevitable between a rising power and a dominant one. But now there has been progress on climate, trade and security issues and what seems a modest “reset” of the Sino-American relationship. Future disagreements between the United States and China are inevitable. But the surprise of a high-level dialogue here last weekend was the interest by both sides in exploring what the Chinese like to call “win-win” cooperation. “I don’t believe there will be a military confrontation between the two countries,” insisted one of China’s top American experts, who not long ago was warning about strains in the relationship. Recent disputes over maritime boundaries in the East and South China seas are “not particularly dangerous,” said another prominent Chinese scholar.

1. SCS tensions won’t escalate

Li ’15

(Xue, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 6/19/15 - )

In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing.

However, **this does not necessary mean the** South China Sea **will spark a U.S.-China military conflict**.

As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.

This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea.

However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are **not core national interests for the** United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given **U.S.-China mutual economic dependence** and China’s comprehensive national strength, **the** United States **is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China** over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.

As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean).

Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue.

At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area.

Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.

Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.

Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move.

As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, **yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation**. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.”

For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region,” a spokesperson said.

Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes.

The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize **cooperation**. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year.

But audiences should be aware that aggressive statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue are not totally representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political elites. Cooperation will be the key when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer.

1. Both sides will back down in the East China Sea as well.

Beauchamp, 14

(Zach, M.Sc IR – LSE, writer – ThinkProgress, former GDS debater, 2/7/14 –“ Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” ThinkProgress)

To some observers, the risk that these nationalist impulses pressure leaders into military escalation during a crisis is the greatest risk of war. The “toxic mix of two rising nationalisms and unresolved mutual resentments” makes “the risks of an accidental conflict becomes uncomfortably real,” Isabel Hilton writes in The Guardian. Time’s Michael Crowley agrees, writing that “national pride and historical grievance” threaten “to drag in the U.S.” into a Pacific war. But the importance of nationalism as a driving force on both the Chinese and Japanese side has been overblown. In fact, a deeper look at the prevailing ideological winds in both China and Japan suggest much more pacific forces are likely to carry the day. First, while it’s easy to see China as an aggressive expansionist power bent on retaking its “rightful place” in East Asia by force, that’s simply inconsistent with China’s track record to date. In an influential 2003 article, Iain Alasdair Johnston, a professor of “China in World Affairs” at Harvard, argued that there’s overwhelming evidence China is more-or-less happy with the current international order. Johnston tested various measures of Chinese interest in upending the global order — like its willingness to work inside the U.N. and internal dialogues within PRC strategists about overtaking the United States — and found very little evidence of China seeking to overturn the global structure, including the U.S.–Japan–Korea alliance system that sets the terms in East Asia. “The regime appears to be unwilling,” according to Johnston, “to bear the economic and social costs of mobilizing the economy and militarizing society to balance seriously against American power and influence in the region, let alone globally.” The Chinese leadership’s ideology is better understood, in Johnston’s view, as centering on expanding China’s power inside the international order rather than overturning through gambles like military aggression in the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. In the face of 2013′s flurry of headlines about a newly aggressive China, Johnston revisited his thesis. He found basically no evidence that the Chinese leadership had changed its tune. Panicked writers, in Johnston’s analysis, were focusing on minor changes in Chinese policy to the exclusion of major continuities (like continued and deepening economic ties with the United States). They were also consistently misinterpreting Beijing’s thinking during major so-called aggressive moves. Take the 2010 Senkaku-Diaoyu flareup, after a Chinese trawler tried to ram some Japanese coast guard ships near the islands. Johnston found no evidence of serious Chinese escalation — the most serious such step reported, an embargo on shipping “rare earth” metals to Japan, was either very weakly enforced or never happened. Moreover, Beijing took explicit steps to tamp down anti-Japanese nationalism, placing anti-war editorials in major party outlets and shutting up the most anti-Japanese voices on the Chinese web during the most diplomatically sensitive time in the dispute. In short, China’s track record in the past ten years suggests the government doesn’t share the hardline nationalist sentiment it occasionally indulges in. Rather, the Chinese government is interested in very moderate regional advances that stop well short of war, and is capable of shutting down the sort of nationalist outburst from its population that might goad the government into war well before such protests might start affecting policy. What about Japan? It’s true that Abe himself holds some fairly hardline nationalist views. For instance, he won’t admit that Japan waged an aggressive war during World War II, which is a pretty gobsmacking bit of revisionism if you think about it. In December, Abe visited a shrine that honors (among others) Japanese war criminals from that era, a move that contributed to the recent bout of nationalistic strife. But there are a number of reasons to think that the resurgent Japanese nationalism Abe represents isn’t going to force war during a crisis. For one thing, his government’s coalition partners would do their damndest to block escalation. New Komeito, whose support keeps Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power, is an odd duck: pacifict Buddhist libertarians is way oversimplified, but it gets the point across. Regardless, they are extremely serious about their pacifism — it’s at the core of their political identity, and it inclines them towards a more generous stance towards Beijing. They’d exert a calming pressure in any crisis.

#### Alt cause - US “Pivot” causes china to feel scared—overwhelms economics

Zhu ‘15

Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is the author and editor of 7 books including China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii, hi the early 1990s, he was Chief Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai. From the article: “Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea” ” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2006%20Dispel%20Distrust%20-%20Zhu.pdf

While U.S. allies and most countries in Asia support the United States' "rebalance" or "pivot" to Asia in the context of China's rapid resurgence, China remains suspicious of U.S. intentions. The key components of this pivot include strengthening U.S. ties with Asian allies, deepening the United States' working relationships with emerging powers, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. Though Obama administration officials have reiterated that the United States does not and will not contain China, many believe that the pivot strategy was at least partially designed to counter China's growing power.2 Chinese leaders feel deeply uncomfortable that the United States has strengthened ties with most of China's neighbors, especially those that have territorial disputes with China; that the United States has begun shifting more naval and air forces to Asia even though it already has forward troops in Japan and South Korea; and that the United States has claimed that the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands without maintaining a position regarding sovereignty over the islands. Chinese leaders also fear that these U.S. policies are emboldening and encouraging the adventurist behaviors of some politicians in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam as evidenced by these politicians' confrontational approaches towards China. The Chinese leadership wonders what Washington has done to improve U.S.-China relations while consolidating the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific region. These concerns may not sound interesting or sensible in Washington, but they are real and serious for many Chinese analysts and policymakers. The bottom line is the distrust between the United States and China has not declined as a result of the pivot.

### 1NC—Relations

#### Economic Ties aren’t key—must also boost defense and social ties.

Florick ‘15

et al; Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to. East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. He was recently interviewed, in print, by Voice of America regarding North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and. on television, with Consider This... where he discussed the recent upheaval in Ukraine. He has also been published in International Affairs Forum, the World Business Institute. and previously in International Affairs Review. “Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2002%20Remapping%20US-China%20Relations%20-%20Florick%20and%20Cronkleton.pdf

The United States and China have a number of ongoing activities to promote bilateral relations. While each of these programs has been met with some success, many have shown little progress. Although forums like the U.S.-Chinese Economic and Strategic Dialogue can tout a number of deliverables, the policies, processes, and procedures within the bilateral relationship are not without their flaws. Today the challenge is two-fold. First, the relationship has deficiencies from a holistic perspective. Successful economic endeavors best characterize the partnership, but gains in defense and social cooperation have been limited. While the emphasis on economic engagement has been pragmatic in the short term, it has limited benefits in the long term. This focus on economics will need to transform into a more diversified effort including defense and social mechanisms to preserve the long-term health of the relationship. Second, the relationship lacks a long-term, strategic focus. Identifying short-, mid-, and long-term goals could help outline a comprehensive plan for developing U.S.-Chinese relations. Growing the partnership will take time and energy, but it will be critical to preserving strategic stability between both states and in the region more generally.

#### US-Sino ties resilient – neither side will go too far *because they’d damage themselves*.

Shuli ‘16

Hu Shuli is the editor-in-chief of Caixin Media. She was Knight Journalism Fellow at Stanford in 1994. She was awarded the 2003 International Editor of the Year by the World Press Review and the 2007 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism by the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University. She is also the professor of the School of Communication and Design at Sun Yat-sen University. She was also once an international editor and chief reporter at China Business Times. Caixin Online - “China-U.S. Relations: Hostage to None” – June 8th - http://english.caixin.com/2016-06-08/100952795.html

Friction points shadowing the recent U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue won't damage this crucial relationship The eighth session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing on June 6 and 7 received more than the usual attention amid signs of increased tension between the two countries. In addition to tensions over disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea, friction has been generated in recent months by China's attempt to be recognized as a "market economy" and America's plan to deploy an anti-missile system in South Korea. Anti-China rhetoric spilling over from the U.S. presidential campaign has also fueled tension. The China-U.S. bilateral relationship has matured to a point where neither country can hurt the other without inflicting damage on itself. The line between cooperation and conflict, however, is constantly adjusting to reflect the dynamics of a fast-changing external environment and domestic politics. Regardless of how the line changes, though, each government has agreed – and should maintain this key position – that strengthening cooperation yields more benefits for all than does dwelling on diversions and friction points.

#### BIT won’t solve relations – won’t increase US access to Chinese markets.

Denecker ‘15

Internally quoting Tim Stratford, a former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative and managing partner at Covington and Burling, - Sander Denecker holds a Master's degree in Chinese Political Economy from Shanghai Jiaotong University - “The US-China BIT – Opportunities and Challenges” – Insight - July 8, 2015 - http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/the-us-china-bit-opportunities-and-challenges/

Will the BIT ensure market access? Based on a study by Covington for the Directorate-General Trade of the European Commission, Stratford predicts that even if the U.S. and China reach an agreement on the BIT there will still be obstacles keeping U.S. companies from receiving national treatment. He asserts that even if an investment is not blocked by the negative list or on the grounds of “essential national security,” its market access can still be curtailed by the types of approvals needed, by the approval criteria set forth by laws and regulations and by administrative discretion.

#### Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increase

Happer ‘12

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

#### Climate impact exaggerated ---mitigation and adaptation will solve

Mendelsohn ‘9

(Robert O. Mendelsohn, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: <http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf>)

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### 1NC—Protectionism

#### Poor US practices won’t spark global protectionism– multilateral systems resilient

Drezner ‘12

(Professor International Politics Tufts University, ’12 (Daniel, October, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)

Despite weaker U.S. power and leadership, the **global trade** regime **has remained resilient**— particularly when compared to the 1930s. This highlights another significant factor: the thicker institutional environment. There were very few multilateral economic institutions of relevance during the Great Depression. No multilateral trade regime existed, and international financial structures remained nascent. The last major effort to rewrite the global rules—the 1933 London Monetary and Economic Conference—ended in acrimony.60 Newly inaugurated president Franklin D. Roosevelt unilaterally took the United States off the gold standard, signaling an end to any attempt at multilateral cooperation. In contrast, the current institutional environment is much thicker, with status-quo policies focused on promoting greater economic openness. A panoply of preexisting informal and formal regimes was able to supply needed services during a time of global economic crisis. At a minimum, institutions like the G20 functioned as useful focal points for the major economies to coordinate policy responses. International institutions like the Bank of International Settlements further provided crucial expertise to rewrite the global rules of the game. Even if the Doha round petered out, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism remained in place to coordinate and adjudicate monitoring and enforcement. Furthermore, the status-quo preference for each element of these regimes was to promote greater cross-border exchange within the rule of law. It is easier for international institutions to reinforce existing global economic norms than to devise new ones. Even if these structures were operating on autopilot, they had already been pointed in the right direction.

#### Singular protectionist actions would cascade across the globe

Ikenson ‘9

(Daniel, associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html

A Little Perspective, Please Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

#### Protectionism unlikely in the status quo

**Siles ‘14**

Gabriel Siles-Brügge, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester, “Explaining the Resilience of Free Trade: The Smoot–Hawley Myth and the Crisis”, Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), Taylor & Francis

Despite the onset of the current economic crisis there has been **no significant move towards protectionism** amongst **most** of the world's economies. Although rational institutionalist explanations point to the role played by the constraining rules of the **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganisation, countries have largely remained open in areas where they have **not legally bound** their liberalisation. While accounts emphasising the increasing interdependence of global supply chains have some merit, I show that such explanations do not tell the full story, as integration into the global economy is not always associated with support for free trade during the crisis. In response, I develop a constructivist argument which highlights how particular ideas about the global trading system have become **rooted** in policy-making discourse, **mediating** the response of policy elites to protectionist pressures and temptations. Trade policy-makers and a group of leading economists have constructed an ideational imperative for continued openness (and for concluding the Doha Round, albeit less successfully) by drawing on a questionable reading of economic history (the Smoot–Hawley myth); by continually stressing protectionism's role as one of the causes of the Great Depression non-liberal responses to the current crisis have been all but ruled out by all except those willing to question the received wisdom.

#### Trade doesn’t solve war

Martin ‘8

(et. al. Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

### 1NC—Solvency

#### No negotiation breakthroughs on BIT – China won’t change their stance due to export pricing policies.

Wilson ‘16

William T. Wilson is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Wilson holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from Purdue University. He earned his bachelor’s in finance and economics from Towson State University. “China Unlikely to Live Up to Its Economic Promises” – Daily Signal - June 15, 2016 - http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/15/china-unlikely-to-live-up-to-its-economic-promises/

This struggle between the West and China was made clear at the 8th annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which was held last week. The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue is a high-level dialogue between the U.S. and China to discuss a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global economic and strategic issues. It was established in 2009 by President Barack Obama and former Chinese President Hu Jintao, as follow-on to the economic-focused Strategic Economic Dialogue established during the George W. Bush administration. Some observers have hailed this latest round in Beijing as the most productive conference to date. The reality, however, is that on substantial issues, there was little or no progress (for good reason). There are a multitude of big picture issues that block progress on bilateral economic issues between the world’s two largest economies. Notably, China is currently suffering enormous excess industrial capacity in most of its critical manufacturing sectors. In May, the U.S. Commerce Department paved the way to levy a 522 percent anti-dumping import duty on Chinese cold-rolled flat steel. While the Chinese made a commitment to reduce excess capacity, this may not materialize anytime soon. The Chinese are likely to continue to price exports well below marginal cost as long as economic growth continues slumping. This also, unfortunately, kills near-term prospects for a bilateral investment treaty with the United States.

#### US Senate must ratify a BIT – they won’t do so

Lam ‘15

Tina Lam is an Associate at Ferguson, Frost, Moore & Young, LLP. “THE LEGAL HURDLES PREVENTING A U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: PROBLEMS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR STANDARDS, AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS” - Florida Coastal Law Review - Spring, 2015 – available via: lexis; lawrev

Due to current contrasting styles that the United States and China typically use in BIT negotiations, with the United States traditionally adopting a more demanding, "liberalizing" approach and China adopting a more "protectionist" approach, the BIT negotiations will be difficult for both countries. n316 In the current political environment, it will likely be difficult for the United States and China to overcome the legal hurdles of national security concerns, environmental and labor provisions, and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms during BIT negotiations. n317 Even if a successful U.S.-China BIT could be negotiated, the BIT would require ratification by the U.S. Senate, which may prove to be difficult because of the general distrust some U.S. senators feel towards the Chinese government. n318 Furthermore, because China can take advantage of the sound economic, political, and legal systems in the United States, signing a BIT with the United States may not be necessary for China. n319 Consequently, it is unlikely that a successful U.S.-China BIT will result from the fifth S&ED. n320